The NPT Review Conference
2005
Paper
Presented on 11 May 2005 at the 2005 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) at the United Nations in New York, 2-27 May 2005 by Elahe
Mohtasham.
The Clash of Ideologies or Peaceful Multilateral Negotiations
Based on National Interests: the Degree of Iran’s Commitment
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates,
I. Introduction:
With much of the world’s attention on the question
of Iran’s nuclear programme, it is vital that all the political
and technological as well as emotional and psychological factors
are taken into account in determining the degree of Iran’s
commitment to the NPT. A set of positive and negative indicators
could be selected to measure the degree of Iran’s commitment
to the NPT. As long as these indicators are not treated as absolute
or fixed concepts but evolving variables which would change from
time to time in response to domestic, regional and international
events, they could serve as useful means to ascertain the most
likely policies and behaviours that Iran may adopt in relation
to its nuclear programme in the next few years.
II. Concerns about Iran’s Nuclear Programme:
Those in the international community who perceive the
Iranian nuclear programme as a crisis, focus on the following
main indicators. First, Iran’s failure to report the technical
details of its nuclear programme was recognised as a breach of
its obligations under its IAEA’s safeguards agreement. (1)
The dual nature of Iran’s political system, the
foundation upon which Iran’s decision-making process is
built, is also of considerable concern. Two decades of Iran’s
technical breaches with its IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement
could be interpreted either as a wider indication of the Iranian
government’s lack of central control over its nuclear material,
technology and activities or as a sign of a conscious and deliberate
attempt by the key and centralised decision-makers in Iran to
conceal Iran’s nuclear programme.
Further more, The United States and its allies accuse Iran of
sponsoring terrorism. These accusations including the risk of
nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists have been
the cause of considerable anxiety and concern, and more than any
other factor thrown doubt on the legitimacy of Iran obtaining
nuclear material and technology. (2) This is exemplified by statements
and images of the clashes of ideologies, war or dispute between
Islamic and western democratic political systems. Meanwhile in
Iran, there lacks any systematic debate over the exact nature
of Iran’s national security interests in relation to the
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the question
of terrorism. Such domestic debate and improved transparency could
significantly impact on Iran’s relations with the West,
building confidence about Iran’s nuclear activity, and on
the legitimacy of Iran being allowed to develop full nuclear fuel
cycle capability, as permitted under the NPT.
III. Positive Indicators of Iran’s Commitment to the NPT:
There are, however, positive indicators, which highlight
Iran’s commitment to the NPT. Iran has, after all, actively
cooperated with the IAEA to rectify its past failures. Under the
IAEA’s Statutes (Article XII: c) if states found in breach
of their IAEA’s safeguards agreements, they will be provided
with an opportunity to return back to compliance within a reasonable
time, before any punitative action taken against them or before
their cases are referred to the United Nations Security Council.
Section 19 of the IAEA’s safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153),
which deals with measures in relation to verification of non-diversion
and any possible non-compliance makes it clear that the IAEA’s
Board of Governors “shall take account of the degree of
assurance provided by the safeguards measures” and “shall
afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board
with any necessary reassurance.” Such a corrective measure
by Iran is exemplified in the detailed report submitted to the
IAEA on 21 October 2003. Iran also signed the Additional Protocol
on 18 December 2003, and whilst the Protocol awaits ratification
by the Iranian parliament (Majles), in a communication to the
Director General of IAEA dated 10 November 2003 Iran committed
itself to act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol
with effect from that date.
Further more, in its first report under the Additional
Protocol, Iran submitted more than a thousand pages of information
about its nuclear programme to the IAEA on 25 May 2004, and provided
access to the IAEA’s inspectors to visit and take environmental
samples of a number of military sites suspected of developing
nuclear material and components in January 2005. Iran has permitted
more than twenty, two-hour notice inspections to be carried out
by the IAEA inspectors under the provisions of the Additional
Protocol.
Moreover, Iran’s multilateral negotiations with Britain,
France and Germany (EU3) and the High Representative of the European
Union since October 2003 could also be considered as a positive
indicator of Iran’s active commitment to the NPT. The first
meeting to initiate these negotiations took place in Tehran on
21 October 2003. Several informal meetings were held to discuss
the content of negotiations until the end of July 2004. The second
set of negotiations within a more formal framework, in the form
of regular working group meetings, took place (based on the 14
November 2004 Paris Agreement) on 13 December 2004 (in Brussels),
21 January 2004 (in Geneva), 8-11 February 2004 (in Geneva), 8-11
March 2005 (in Geneva). A steering committee to consider the results
of December-March working groups took place in Paris on 23 March
2005, when the parties agreed to continue with the negotiations
in April 2005. Between 19 and 20 April 2005 a working group to
discuss the technical issues related to the nuclear issue was
held in Geneva which made further recommendations to continue
the discussions at a steering committee meeting in London on 29
April 2005. The position of the parties at the last round of negotiations
held in London on 29 April 2005 was as follows. Iran stated its
intent to resume uranium enrichment under an IAEA inspection regime.
The British and Germans have been trying to secure Iran’s
agreement to abandon enrichment in return for benefits including
a light water reactor for nuclear energy. France may be willing
to support limited uranium enrichment, a compromise that at the
present time would be unacceptable to the United States. Britain
hopes to keep the negotiations continue until Iran’s presidential
elections on 17 June 2005. They believe that a pragmatic victor
could open way for an agreement. As a result of these negotiations,
Iran has abided by its voluntary agreement since October 2003
not to enrich uranium using its gas centrifuge facilities and
plants in Natanz.
Therefore, in considering Iran’s commitment to
the NPT, all the negative and positive developments would need
to be taken into account before reaching a final judgement about
Iran’s commitment to the NPT.
IV. List of Recommendations:
i. Addressing Emotional and Psychological as Well as Political
and Technological Concerns:
There are two separate aspects in all the discussions
concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. The first aspect would
be related to Iran’s scientific and technological capabilities
to develop its own indigenous nuclear power, and all the subsequent
intellectual and political discussions associated with Iran’s
rights to possess such a capability under the NPT and the IAEA’s
safeguards system. The second aspect would be related to the psychological
and emotional concerns of the international community as to how
far Iran with an Islamic political system could be trusted to
employ the nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. Therefore,
in addition to compliance with the IAEA safeguards and other technical
measures, there would be a need for Iran to provide additional
reassurances to address, more specifically, the emotional and
psychological concerns of the international community. Greater
openness and transparency in relation to all the aspects of its
nuclear programme, and conscientious and systematic discussions
about the exact nature of Iran’s relations with groups classified
as terrorists by the West would be important steps in this regard.
ii. Providing Negative Security Assurances & Tangible Steps
Towards Disarmament:
Iran, like most other non-nuclear weapon states at this
NPT Review Conference, continues to seek legally binding and unconditional
negative security assurances from the nuclear weapon states, in
particular from France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The multilateral negotiations amongst France, Germany, the United
Kingdom (EU3), the High Representative of the European Union and
Iran to discuss the nuclear, security and economic issues (which
the United States may also join in the near future) has provided
some degree of political and military security and reassurance
for Iran. There is a general belief that Iran would not be militarily
attacked while the current negotiations continue.
By a legally binding negative security assurance, it is meant
an independent agreement or treaty, or a protocol attached to
the NPT (instead of the present general statements of intent embodied,
for example, in the 1978 and 1982 unilateral statements by the
nuclear weapon states at the first and second United Nations General
Assembly Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD), or a series
of separate statements by the nuclear weapon states reflected
in the 11 April 1995 Security Council resolution 984. However,
some would argue that a Security Council resolution would be legally
binding.
The historical background to the existing security assurances
is as follows. In 1968 the three NPT depository nuclear weapon
states (the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR) provided
positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states through
the Security Council resolution 255, which was mainly based on
the general commitments that had already existed in the United
Nations Charter. At the first UNSSOD in 1978, China was the only
nuclear weapon state that committed itself not to attack or threaten
to attack a non-nuclear weapon state with nuclear weapons; whilst
the USSR’s statement on negative security assurances was
specific to those non-nuclear weapon states that renounced the
acquisition of nuclear weapons and their deployment on their territories.
However, the United Kingdom and the United States were prepared
to provide negative security assurances only to those states that
were not allied with a nuclear weapon state. France’s negative
security assurances, at the time, were limited to those states
within the nuclear weapon free zones. However, at the second UNSSOD
in 1982, France provided non-nuclear weapon states with similar
commitments that the United Kingdom and the United States had
provided to non-nuclear weapon states. Although the Security Council
resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 provided both negative and positive
security assurances, the type of assurances were seen as being
similar to the positive security assurances that the three NPT
depository nuclear weapon states had provided in 1968. The conditional
terms of the Security Council Resolution 984 have been criticised
on the grounds that the NATO states and the Russian Federation
continue to keep their option of the first use of nuclear weapons;
and that in case of a nuclear attack, the agreement of the Security
Council had to be obtained before any action in support of the
victim or against a nuclear aggressor could be taken. Following
the 984 Resolution, China restated its long-time position regarding
no-first use of nuclear weapons and called for an international
convention on no-first use.
The three nuclear weapon states have been reluctant to
provide a legally binding and unconditional negative security
assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, on three
basic military grounds. First, there is the assumption on the
part of the these nuclear weapon states that an unconditional
negative security assurance would undermine the basic element
of uncertainty, which is often defined as the key in maintaining
a credible nuclear deterrence against an adversary. Second, France,
the United Kingdom, the United States as well as the Russian Federation
continue to regard as legitimate the right to retaliate with nuclear
weapons in the case of an attack with chemical or biological weapons.
Furthermore, these nuclear weapon states believe that an unconditional
negative security assurance might encourage the use of chemical
and biological weapons by countries such as Iran at the time of
war and crises.
The negative and positive security assurances embodied
in the 1995 Security Council Resolution 984 are conditional, and
as far as the three nuclear weapon states (France, the United
Kingdom and the United States) are concerned, such assurances
would not be applicable to those non-nuclear weapon states, which
have not been in full compliance with their NPT safeguards agreements.
These nuclear weapon states may interpret the 984 Security Council
Resolution in a way to exclude Iran from benefiting the terms
of the 984 Resolution. Therefore, some believe that in the whole
of the Middle East and South Asia as well as Central Asia and
Caucasus, Iran is the only major country with inadequate security
protection. India, Israel and Pakistan would rely on their own
nuclear weapons for deterrence and defence. Turkey as a member
of the NATO and all the Arab states of the Persian Gulf would
be protected by their close military and political relationship
with the United States and its allies. It is within this overall
regional and international context that Iran’s civil nuclear
programme, similar to the full nuclear fuel cycle facilities in
Japan, has been viewed by some forming a viable latent nuclear
deterrence for Iran. Therefore, it would be vital that in any
discussions of Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran’s legitimate
security concerns to be fully taken into account. In this context
and at this NPT Review Conference, any proposals to halt future
nuclear full cycle capabilities or attempts to reinterpret the
Articles of the NPT should address the wider issues of disarmament,
negative and positive security assurances, and confidence building
measures at the international level. In the absence of this wider
perspective, measures and proposals, which are aimed at enhancing
the international security may, in the long term, undermine the
whole structure of the nuclear non-proliferation system.
iii. Pursuing Diplomatic Solutions Instead of Military Attack:
Although military attack on Iran’s known nuclear
facilities could not be discounted, any such military attack would
generate further security problems for the whole region, as Iran
would most likely to withdraw from the NPT and initiate, without
any reservations, a nuclear weapon programme using the scientific
knowledge, skills and any material or facilities, which would
survive following such a military attack.
Notes and References:
1. The IAEA’s Board of Governors recognised this
failure as a breach in one Statement and six consecutive resolutions
between 19 June 2003 and 29 November 2004.
2. However, according to Professor Gary Sick (Director
of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, and a former
member of the U.S. National Security Council staff as well as
the Principal Presidential Assistant for Iran during the Iranian
revolution and hostage crisis), “Terrorism is murky and
highly ambiguous;” See, Gary Sick, ‘Iran: Confronting
Terrorism’, The Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 2003, No.
26:4), pp. 83-98, http://www.twq.com/info/archives.cfm;
according to Professor William O. Beeman (Director of the Middle
East Studies at Brown University and Visiting Professor of Cultural
and Social Anthropology at Stanford University), ‘Iran’s
support of terrorism is less than it seems’, in Agence Global,
27 February 2005, http://www.agenceglobal.com
©
2005 Elahe Mohtasham
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